Using Random Digit Representation for Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication by Mostafa, Mohannad
Using Random Digit Representation
for Elliptic Curve Scalar
Multiplication
by
Mohannad Mostafa
A thesis
presented to the University of Waterloo
in fulfillment of the
thesis requirement for the degree of
Master of Science
in
Electrical and Computer Engineering
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2018
c© Mohannad Mostafa 2018
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis,
including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.
I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.
ii
Abstract
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) was introduced independently by Miller and
Koblitz in 1986. Compared to the integer factorization based Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
(RSA) cryptosystem, ECC provides shorter key length with the same security level. There-
fore, it has advantages in terms of storage requirements, communication bandwidth and
computation time. The core and the most time-consuming operation of ECC is scalar
multiplication, where the scalar is an integer of several hundred bits long.
Many algorithms and methodologies have been proposed to speed up the scalar multi-
plication operation. For example, non-adjacent form (NAF), window-based NAF (wNAF),
double bases form, multi-base non-adjacent form and so on. The random digit representa-
tion (RDR) scheme can represent any scalar using a set that contains random odd digits
including the digit 1. The RDR scheme is efficient in terms of the average number of
non-zeros and it also provides resistance to power analysis attacks.
In this thesis, we propose a variant of the RDR scheme. The proposed variant, referred
to as implementation-friendly recoding algorithm (IFRA), is advantageous over RDR in
hardware implementation for two reasons. First, IFRA uses simple operations such as
scan, match, and shift. Second, it requires no long adder to update the scalar. In this
thesis we also investigate the average density of non-zero digits of IFRA. It is shown that
the average density of the variant is close to the average density of RDR. Moreover, a
hardware implementation of the variant scheme is presented using pre-computed values
stored in one dual-port memory. A performance comparison for different recoding schemes
is presented by demonstrating the run-time efficiency of IFRA compared to other recoding
schemes. Finally, the IFRA is applied to scalar multiplication on ECC and we compare its
computation time against those based on NAF, wNAF, and RDR.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) was proposed independently by Koblitz [18] and
Miller [24] in 1985. ECC uses smaller key sizes compared to the integer factorization based
Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) [31] for the same security level. For instance, according
to National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), to achieve a 128-bit Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) security level, it’s recommended to use ECC with key sizes of
256 bits. However, to achieve the same level of security in RSA, a key size of 3072 bits is
needed. In the past, a lot of research has been done to speed up and improve ECC, e.g.,
[33], [30], [13], and [9].
Elliptic curve scalar multiplication is a fundamental operation in many elliptic curve
based protocols such as Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH) and Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). The speed of scalar multiplication determines the efficiency
of these algorithms and the system where these algorithms are implemented, for example
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smart cards, cellphones, and RFID tags. An extensive research has been done in the recent
years to reduce the execution time and memory requirements of scalar multiplication in
order to efficiently implement ECC on different devices.
Scalar multiplication involves three basic operations: finite field arithmetic, point or
group operations (i.e., point doubling and adding), and scalar recoding. Significant work
has been done in each of these areas in order to improve the efficiency and performance of
scalar multiplication.
There exist many strategies to enhance the performance of scalar multiplication.
Firstly, efficient group arithmetic has been used in order to improve the performance of
scalar multiplication. For example, the usage of Jacobi coordinates in point addition and
doubling eliminates the need of costly inversion operations over the underlying finite field.
Secondly, various representations, such as non-adjacent form, of the scalar k are used in
order to reduce the number of nonzero digits and therefore, reduce the number of additions
in scalar multiplication. A number of approaches have been proposed to use pre-computed
values which can improve the speed of scalar multiplication operation. Other schemes
that improve the scalar multiplication include sliding window method, comb method and
Montgomery ladder [26].
1.1 Motivation
Improving the performance of scalar multiplication on elliptic curve has been the goal
of many researchers. Their efforts include not only speeding up the computation of scalar
2
multiplication but also protecting this operation from side-channel attacks based on timing
[20], power [19], electromagnetic emanation [29], and faults [2].
One of the countermeasures to protect the scalar multiplication operation against Dif-
ferential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks is randomization. To this end, several approaches
have been proposed. For example, references [27] and [13] proposed to insert a random
decision in the process of generating the binary signed representation of k. Reference [15]
inserts random signed digits in a complex radix representation of the scalar as a way to
improve resistance to power analysis attacks against a class of high performance elliptic
curve cryptosystem. Analysis of the singed binary and complex radix representation of an
integer can be found in [10] and [11].
Recently, the authors of [22] have proposed a random integer algorithm that general-
izes the fractional Window Non-Adjacent Form (wNAF) by allowing random digits to be
chosen as the base for the scalar k. In this work, we focus on the usage of random digit
representation. In particular, we give an implementation friendly version of the random
digit representation algorithm introduced in [22].
The use of random digit representation provides resistance against power analysis
attacks. The proposed variant inherits countermeasures against such attacks from the
original algorithm. Firstly, it does not allow traditional attacks to be mounted since the
digit set is randomly chosen. Secondly, any scalar k can have many different representations
for a given digit set.
3
1.2 Thesis Organization
The organization of this thesis is as follows.
Chapter 2 provides a background on elliptic curve cryptography. It explains basic
concepts of point doubling and point addition. Furthermore, it provides a brief summary
of different scalar multiplication algorithms related to this work, such as Non-Adjacent
Form (NAF), window method, and double base number system.
In Chapter 3, we review random digit representation of integers. Preliminaries are
provided to understand this scheme. Average density of this scheme along with its pre-
computation phase is explained. We end the chapter by explaining how this scheme is
resistant to differential and simple power attacks.
In Chapter 4, we present an implementation friendly version of the random digit rep-
resentation algorithm of [22]. The new variant is referred to as implementation-friendly re-
coding algorithm (IFRA). A prototype implementation of IFRA using Field Programmable
Gate Arrays (FPGAs) is provided. We also provide a comparison of IFRA with similar
other algorithms. Finally, we end the chapter by applying the IFRA to scalar multiplica-
tion.
Chapter 5 summarizes our contributions and provides suggestions for future work.
4
Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we provide a brief overview of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). We
present the core operations of point arithmetic such as point doubling and point addition
which are essential concepts to understand elliptic curve scalar multiplication. Further-
more, we summarize a number of algorithms commonly used to improve the efficiency of
computing the scalar multiplication. These algorithms are based on non-adjacent form,
wNAF, and double base number systems.
2.1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
An elliptic curve E over a field K is defined, according to [14], by an equation of the
following form:
E: y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6 (2.1)
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where a1, a2, a3, a4, a6 ∈ K.
If L is any extension field of K, then the set of L-rational points on E is
E(L) = {(x, y) ∈ L× L : y2 + a1xy + a3y − x3 − a2x2 − a4x− a6} ∪ {O} (2.2)
where O is the point at infinity.
In this thesis, we work over prime fields denoted by Fp. If K = Fp, and p > 3 is a
prime, Equation. 2.1 can be simplified to the following equation:
E: y2 = x3 + ax+ b (2.3)
where a, b ∈ Fp.
Then, using Equation 2.3, we can represent the set of points in Equation 2.2 for ECC
over prime fields as follows:
E(Fp) = {(x, y) ∈ Fp × Fp : y2 − x3 − ax− b = 0} ∪ {O} (2.4)
In the following section, a brief introduction to point arithmetic of elliptic curve is pre-
sented.
2.1.1 Point Arithmetic Over Prime Field
Different forms of elliptic curve points have been explored to improve the speed of
point doubling and point addition. In this section, we review three different forms that
6
will help in building up necessary background to understand the rest of this chapter.
Some general characteristics of elliptic curves over a finite field are the following [14]:
1. Identity: P +O = O + P = P for P ∈ E(Fp).
2. Negatives: if P = (x, y) ∈ E(Fp), then (x, y) + (x,−y) = O, where the point (x,−y)
is denoted by −P and is called the negative of P .
3. Point addition: Let P = (x1, y1) ∈ E(Fp) and Q = (x2, y2) ∈ E(Fp), where P 6= ±Q.
Then P +Q = (x3, y3), where:
x3 =
(
y2 − y1
x2 − x1
)2
− x1 − x2 and y3 =
(
y2 − y1
x2 − x1
)
(x1 − x3)− y1 (2.5)
4. Point doubling: Let P = (x1, y1) ∈ E(Fp), where P 6= −P . Then 2P = (x3, y3),
where
x3 =
(
3x21 + a
2y1
)2
− 2x1 and y3 =
(
3x21 + a
2y1
)
(x1 − x3)− y1 (2.6)
A graphical example of point doubling and point addition on elliptic curve can be seen
in Figure 2.1.
Affine point representation P = (x, y) can be replaced by different coordinate systems
in order to improve point arithmetic in terms of field operation. The following coordinate
systems are the most popular ones and have been researched extensively:
• Standard Projective Coordinates: The affine point (x, y) corresponds to the projec-
tive point (x, y, 1). To generalize, a projective point can be represented as (X : Y : Z)
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where Z 6= 0 and it corresponds to the affine point (X/Z, Y/Z). The infinity point
O in the projective coordinate is represented as (0 : 1 : 0) and the negative point of
(X : Y : Z) is (X : −Y : Z).
• Jacobian Projective Coordinates: These are similar to the standard projective coordi-
nates in terms of the negative point and the infinity point. However, the correspond-
ing affine representation of a Jacobian point is different. Given a Jacobian projective
coordinate in the form (X : Y : Z), the corresponding affine form is (X/Z2, Y/Z2)
Figure 2.1: Addition and doubling of elliptic curve points [14]
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2.2 Scalar Multiplication over Elliptic Curves
Scalar multiplication is the fundamental operation in elliptic curve cryptographic sys-
tems. It is analogous to exponentiation in the multiplicative group of integers modulo a
fixed integer. Scalar multiplication results in adding the point P to itself k times, i.e.,
kP = P + · · ·+ P + P
The order of a point P is the smallest integer u such that uP = O.
The number of points on a curve E(Fp) is denoted by #E(Fp) and represents the
order of a curve E over the underlying finite field Fp. Hesse’s theorem [14] states that
#E(Fp) ≈ p
In this thesis, whenever we mention the scalar k, we always assume k is a n-bit integer.
In the next section, a brief overview of different scalar multiplication algorithms is
represented to help the reader understand the necessary background for this work.
2.2.1 Double-and-Add
One of the easiest and most straightforward methods to compute scalar multiplica-
tion is double-and-add. Scalar multiplication on elliptic curve is analogous to the square-
and-multiply algorithms which is used in exponentiation-based cryptosystems [14]. Scalar
multiplication, denoted as kP can be computed as follows:
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Let k be an n-bit scalar where its binary representation is k = (kn−1, kn−2, · · · , k1, k0)2,
ki ∈ {0, 1} for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. Then, one can write
kP =
(
n−1∑
i=0
ki2
i
)
P
= 2(2(· · · 2(2(kn−1P ) + kn−2P ) + · · · ) + k1P ) + k0P (2.7)
= (kn−12n−1P ) + · · ·+ (k121P ) + k0P (2.8)
The above equations lead to two algorithms that can be used to compute the scalar
multiplication: left-to-right double-and-add which corresponds to Equation. 2.7 and right-
to-left double-and-add which corresponds to Equation. 2.8. These two algorithms are
presented below.
Algorithm 1 Left-to-right binary double-and-add algorithm [30]
Require: P ∈ E(Fp), k = (kn−1, · · · , k1, k0)2
Ensure: Q = kP
1: R0 ← kn−1P ; R1 ← P
2: for i = n− 2 down to 0 do
3: R0 ← 2R0
4: if ki = 1 then
5: R0 ← R0 +R1
6: end if
7: end for
8: return R0
Both binary double-and-add algorithms require n doubling and about n
2
additions on
average. The expected number of operations (addition (A) and doubling (D)) to compute
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Algorithm 2 Right-to-left binary double-and-add algorithm [30]
Require: P ∈ E(Fp), k = (kn−1, · · · , k1, k0)2
Ensure: Q = kP
1: R0 ← O; R1 ← P
2: for i = 0 to n− 1 do
3: if ki = 1 then
4: R0 ← R0 +R1
5: end if
6: R1 ← 2R1
7: end for
8: return R0
kP using double-and-add is
n
2
A+ (n− 1)D
Even though both algorithms require the same number of operations, Algorithm 1 has
an advantage over Algorithm 2 by using a fixed register which contains the value P during
the computation. On the other hand, Algorithm 2 can lead to a shorter critical path for
its loop since R0 and R1 can be updated in parallel when implemented in hardware.
2.2.2 Non-Adjacent Form (NAF)
Let P = (x, y) ∈ E(Fp), then −P = (x,−y). Thus, point subtraction operation on
elliptic curve is as efficient as addition. This motivates using signed digit representation,
such as Let k′ = (k′n, k
′
n−1, · · · , k′1, k′0)2, where k′ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. Non-adjacent form (NAF)
[33] is a signed digit representation which has the following properties [14]:
• No two adjacent digits are non-zeros.
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• NAF(k) is unique.
• The length of NAF(k) is at most one digit longer than the binary representation of
k.
• Given n-bit k integer, the average density of non-zero digits in NAF(k) is 1
3
.
Algorithm 3 shows how NAF(k) can be found efficiently. Once NAF(k) is computed,
kP can be computed using a slightly modified algorithm from left-to-right double-and-
add algorithm (Algorithm 1). A scalar multiplication algorithm using NAF is given in
Algorithm 4. If the length of NAF(k) is l, the expected running time of Algorithm 4 is
l
3
A+ lD
Algorithm 3 Computing NAF(k)[14]
Require: A positive integer k
Ensure: NAF(k)
1: i← 0
2: while k ≥ 0 do
3: if k is even then
4: ki ← 0
5: else
6: ki ← 2− (k mod 4)
7: k = k − ki
8: end if
9: k ← k/2
10: i = i+ 1
11: end while
12: return (ki−1, ki−2, · · · , k1, k0)
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Algorithm 4 Scalar multiplication using binary NAF method [14]
Require: P ∈ E(Fp), k = (kl−1, · · · , k1, k0)2 in NAF representation
Ensure: Q = kP
1: Q← O
2: for i = l − 1 down to 0 do
3: Q← 2Q
4: if ki = 1 then
5: Q← Q+ P
6: end if
7: if ki = −1 then
8: Q← Q− P
9: end if
10: end for
11: return Q
2.2.3 Window Method (wNAF)
The running time of Algorithm 4 can be reduced if extra memory is available and by
using a window method where w digits of k are processed at a time. Different variants have
been introduced for the window method in [33] and [25]. Window NAF is an expansion of
NAF where it uses pre-computed values to process w digits at once and allows to execute
several point operations on these digits. Therefore, it reduces the density of nonzero terms.
Each digit k has a unique representation of wNAF which can be denoted as NAFw(k).
If a window is chosen to be of size w, the number of pre-computed points will be up to
(2w−2 − 1) and the average density of wNAF is 1
w+1
[21].
Algorithm 5 shows how to find NAFw(k) for a positive integer k and a window width
of size w. Computing NAFw(k) is similar to Algorithm 3. The main difference is in Step
6, where ki is chosen to be in the range [−2w−1, 2w−1 − 1].
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Algorithm 5 Computing NAFw(k)[14]
Require: A positive integer k, window width w
Ensure: NAFw(k)
1: i← 0
2: while k ≥ 0 do
3: if k is even then
4: ki ← 0
5: else
6: ki ← k mod 2w
7: k = k − ki
8: end if
9: k ← k/2
10: i = i+ 1
11: end while
12: return (ki−1, ki−2, · · · , k1, k0)
Computing the scalar multiplication using NAFw(k) instead of NAF(k) is shown in
Algorithm 5. The expected running time of Algorithm 5, if the length of wNAF is l, is as
follows [14] [
1D + (2w−2 − 1A)]+ [ l
w + 1
A+ lD
]
Algorithm 5 applies a window of width w where it moves from right to left skipping
consecutive zeroes. Moreover, a sliding window can be applied on NAF of k (Algorithm 3)
where it skips 0s after a digit ki is processed so it ensures the value within the window is
odd. The use of sliding window decreases the number of additions and reduces the number
of precomputed points to almost one half.
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Algorithm 6 Scalar multiplication using wNAF method [14]
Require: P ∈ E(Fp), k = (kl−1, · · · , k1, k0)2 in wNAF representation, Window width w
Ensure: Q = kP
1: Compute Pi = i for i ∈ 1, 3, 5, · · · , 2w−1 − 1
2: Q← O
3: for i = l − 1 down to 0 do
4: Q← 2Q
5: if ki 6= 0 then
6: if ki > 0 then
7: Q← Q+ Pki
8: else
9: Q← Q− P−ki
10: end if
11: end if
12: end for
13: return Q
2.2.4 Double Base Number System
Double Base Number System (DBNS) was first introduced by Dimitrov, Jullien and
C. Miller [8] in 1999 and later used in the context of elliptic curve cryptography [6]. DBNS
is very redundant recoding algorithm where a digit can be represented in many different
forms of DBNS. DBNS is an alternative for other recoding algorithms like NAF, wNAF,
and window method. DBNS represents an integer as a product of 2 and 3 or their powers.
Let k be an integer. Then the DBNS representation of k can be defined as follows:
k =
n∑
i=0
si2
ai3bi where si ∈ {−1, 1}, and ai, bi ≥ 0 (2.9)
Using the aforementioned equation, any integer k can be represented in DBNS using
the greedy algorithm. Algorithm 7 shows how to find DBNS expansion for an integer
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k ∈ N. The algorithm finds the closest t (an integer in the form 2a3b) where k − t is
minimal. Then, it sets k = k − t. The algorithm keeps repeating this process until k = 0.
It is proved in [7] that for any positive integer k, finding DBNS expansion using the greedy
algorithm (Algorithm 7) takes at most O
(
log k
log log k
)
iterations.
Algorithm 7 Greedy algorithm to compute DBNS expansion
Require: k ∈ N
Ensure: (ai, bi)i such that k =
∑n
i=1 2
ai3bi
1: i← 0
2: while k > 0 do
3: Compute t = 2a3b which is the largest 2-3 integer smaller than k
4: ai ← a
5: bi ← b
6: i← i+ 1
7: k ← k − t
8: end while
9: return (ai, bi)i
After finding the DBNS expansion of an integer k, we need to precompute max ai dou-
bling and max bi tripling to compute kP . However, using the greedy algorithm (Algorithm
7) to generate DBNS expansion of an integer k, it is hard to find the two lower bounds
ai and bi [9]. Therefore, double-base chain has been introduced in [6] to allow the use of
DBNS with generic elliptic curves. The idea presented is mainly the same as Algorithm 7
but with an additional condition a1 ≥ a2 ≥ a3 · · · ≥ an and b1 ≥ b2 ≥ b3 · · · ≥ bn. Adding
this property to Algorithm 7 allows computing kP from right-to-left using DBNS.
To give an example of how double base chain can affect DBNS representation of an
integer k, we provide the following example (which is similar to the example in [9]) to find
double base representation of integer n = 841232 using the greedy algorithm (Algorithm
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7) and using the condition of double base chain:
• Greedy algorithm:
841232 = 2738 + 1424
1424 = 2136 − 34
34 = 2232 − 2
which results in, 841232 = 2738 + 2136 − 2232 + 21
• Double base chain:
841232 = 2738 + 1424
1424 = 2136 − 34
34 = 2033 + 7
7 = 2032 − 2
2 = 2031 − 1
So, 841232 = 2738 + 2136 − 2033 − 2032 + 2031 − 1
As we can see from the above example that double base chain representation is strictly
larger than greedy algorithm representation. However, with double base chain we can
compute [841232]P trivially. We can obtain kP as follows:
841232P = [3]([3]([3]([2133]([2632] + P )− P )− P ) + P )− P
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which requires only 5 addition, 7 doubling, and 8 tripling operations.
2.3 Power Analysis Attacks
Different side channel analysis attacks are used to recover the secret key. In this section,
Simple Power Analysis (SPA) and Differential Power Attack (DPA) are briefly presented.
2.3.1 Simple Power Analysis Attack
Simple Power Analysis (SPA) interprets power consumption collected during different
cryptographic operations which can reveal some information about the key [19]. SPA
can yield information about how a cryptographic device operates and obtain knowledge
about secret key using a single power trace. A trace can be defined as the set of power
consumption measurements taken across a cryptographic operation.
SPA trace can distinguish different operations, such as addition from doubling in ECC
operations, and therefore allows the attacker to gain information to recover the secret key.
In order to resist such an attack, the computation of different arithmetic operations should
be as regular as possible. So, an attacker will not be able to distinguish between different
arithmetic operations being computed. This can be done on the algorithm level, such as the
Montgomery ladder [26], or at the group algorithmic level, such as using block atomicity
[4].
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2.3.2 Differential Power Attack
Differential power attack uses the analysis of different power traces of a large number
of executions of the same computation to reveal information about the secret key [19]. One
approach to resist differential power attack is randomization [19]. However, some recent
works have proved that differential power attack can defeat a certain type of randomiza-
tion, such as binary signed digit randomization [12]. Even though these algorithms provide
a variety of recoding, it just provides only a small amount of randomness to the represen-
tation, in particular, a randomized algorithm will fail if it doesn’t provide a sufficiently
large number of possible local internal states and transitions from that state, which will
make these algorithms vulnerable to collision attacks.
Furthermore, if an algorithm uses a digit set, such as wNAF, differential power analysis
works if the set is known in advance where the attacker makes a direct use of the knowl-
edge of the digit set to produce the probabilistic state machines used in cryptoanalysis [16].
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, a brief background to elliptic curve cryptography has been provided.
Different scalar multiplications algorithms have been reviewed. Double-and-add is the
easiest and the most straightforward form to compute scalar multiplication. However, in
order to speed up the computation of scalar multiplication, the scalar can be recoded so
that the number of non-zero digits in its representation is reduced. To this end, a number
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of recoding schemes have been presented, such as non-adjacent form, window method, and
double base number system. DBNS allows to represent a scalar k as a sum of products of
2 and 3 or their powers. However, computing DBNS expansion is not as efficient as other
recoding schemes, such as window method (wNAF). Finally, a brief background to power
analysis attacks has been provided.
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Chapter 3
Random Digit Representation
There are different recoding algorithms that improve the performance of scalar multi-
plication operation in elliptic curves. As mentioned in Chapter 2, NAF, wNAF and double
base system are some of these algorithms. Fractional wNAF is a method that uses a digit
set up to m of the form {1, 3, 5, . . . ,m}. A new recoding algorithm presented in [22] is a
generalized form of frac-wNAF. One advantage of the random recoding algorithm is the
very large (asymptotically infinite) number of digit sets.
This chapter provides an overview of the recoding for random digit representation.
It also discusses how such a representation can increase resistance against power analysis
attacks.
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3.1 Recoding for Random Digit Representation
LetD+ = {d1, d2, · · · , dt} be a set of odd random integers. LetD− = {−d1,−d2, · · · ,−dt}
and
D = D+ ∪ D− ∪ {0}
. We define N(D) as the set of all integers that can be represented using D. In order to
represent any integer using the set D, N(D) must be equal to Z. Since gcd(Z) = 1, gcd(D)
should also be equal to 1. In order to ensure gcd(D) = 1, the set D must contain the digit
1. In the rest of this chapter, we will only consider the set D that includes 1 as following
D+ = {1, d1, d2, · · · , dt}.
In order to present the recoding algorithm, we define some notations. Let w be an
integer, where w > 0. Then, for any integer x, we define pw(x) = x mod 2
w. We now
form two sets as follows: D+w = pw(D+) and D−w = {2w − d : d ∈ D+w}. In addition, we
define W = blog2(max(D+))c. Then, we define h(k), where k is an odd integer, as the
largest integer h ≤ W + 2 such that there exists a digit d ∈ D that satisfies the following
two conditions:
• d < k
• ph(k) ∈ D
Finally, we can define the mapping map digitD: N→ D as follows:
• If k is even: digitD(k) = 0
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• if k is odd:
– h = h(k).
– If ph(k) ∈ Dh, then digitD(k) = d for which ph(k) = ph(d)
– if 2h − ph(k) ∈ Dh, digitD(k) = −d for which ph(d) = 2h − ph(k).
This map is well defined which means digitd(k) exists for any integer k.
Algorithm 8 digitD(k) function [22]
Require: k ∈ N, digit set D
Ensure: 0 or d such that d ∈ D
1: if k is even then
2: return 0
3: else
4: h is the largest integer h ≤ W + 2 such that ph(k) ∈ D
5: if ph(k) ∈ D+h then
6: if ph(k) = ph(d) and d < k then
7: return d
8: end if
9: else
10: if ph(k) = 2
h − ph(d) and d < k then
11: return −d
12: end if
13: end if
14: end if
Algorithm 8 summarizes how the map of digitD is implemented. Now, we can define
the Random Digit Representation (RDR) algorithm that uses digitD which is defined in
Algorithm 9.
Finally, after we have the D-representation of an integer k, we can compute the scalar
multiplication using Algorithm 10.
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Algorithm 9 Random Digit Representation of an Integer k [22]
Require: k ∈ N, digit set D+ = {1, d1, d2, · · · , dl}
Ensure: k = (ki−1ki−2 · · · k0)2 such that ki ∈ D
1: i = 0
2: while k 6= 0 do
3: ki = digitD(k)
4: k = k−ki
2
5: i = i+ 1
6: end while
7: return (ki−1ki−2 · · · k0)2
Algorithm 10 Scalar Multiplication using RDR (Algorithm 9)
Require: An integer k = (kl−1kl−2 · · · k0)2, a point P and digit set D
Ensure: Q = kP
1: R0 ← P ;
2: for d ∈ D do
3: Td = dP
4: end for
5: for i = n− 1 down to 0 do
6: R0 ← 2R0
7: if ki 6= 0 then
8: R0 ← R0 + Tki
9: end if
10: end for
11: return R0
3.2 Average Density
Average density of non-zero terms of a recoding algorithm is an important parameter
that is taken into account when we measure the performance of a specific recoding algo-
rithm. The smaller the average density is, the faster scalar multiplication operation will
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be.
Let k be an integer and D+ = {1, d1, d2, · · · , dn} is a set of random digits. Then, for
all w > 2 we define D(w) = #Dw
2w−1 . In [18], it has been proven that the average density of
non-zero terms achieved by the random digit representation (RDR) is 1
aD+1
where
aD = 2D(W + 2) +
W+1∑
w=2
D(w) (3.1)
3.3 Resistance to Power Analysis Attacks
One of the main countermeasures to side channel attacks is randomization. Random-
ization of the digit set can provide an added resistance to differential and simple power
analysis attacks. Below we briefly discuss the security of the RDR based scalar multipli-
cation against simple and differential power analysis attacks.
To resist SPA, the computation of different arithmetic operations, such as doubling
and addition in ECC, should be as regular as possible so that an attacker will not be able
to identify any operation (e.g., point addition) whose execution depends on one or more
bits of the secret key. In Algorithm 10, the point addition does depend on the secret (i.e.,
ki in the i-th iteration); however, ki is from a set of digits chosen randomly to represent
the scalar. Hence, it is claimed in [22] that when there is enough randomness in the digit
set, Algorithm 10 is resistant to simple power analysis attack.
Furthermore, [22] argues that Algorithm 10 provides resistance to differential power
attacks for two reasons. First, since the digit sets are not known in advance, the attacker
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cannot mount the attack similar to the one mentioned in [16]. Second, a given digit set
can have many different recoding since the algorithm itself provides randomness [22].
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have reviewed the random digit recoding presented in [22] which
is a generalization of wNAF. The algorithm allows an integer to be represented using any
digit set as long as the digit set has 1 in it. The algorithm provides resistance against
simple and differential power analysis attacks.
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Chapter 4
Implementation Friendly Recoding
for RDR
In this chapter, we provide an Implementation-friendly Recoding Algorithm (IFRA)
for random digit representation. We then present a hardware implementation of IFRA on
FPGA. We also apply our IFRA to scalar multiplication and compare its timing results
with those obtained using NAF, wNAF and RDR recoding.
4.1 IFRA Description
The algorithm presented in Chapter 3 (Algorithm 9) generalizes fractional wNAF
recoding. However, previous research has not investigated any hardware implementation
for Algorithm 9. Also, the digitD(k) function in step 3 of the algorithm poses quite a bit
27
of challenge for efficient implementation in hardware due to its variable window sizes (h)
and modular reduction operations which may require quite a bit of area in hardware if not
designed in an efficient manner. Therefore, we propose a new hardware friendly recoding
algorithm for RDR that is adopted from Algorithm 8 and 9.
The following are some important notations used in the algorithm being proposed.
Let D be the random digit set and W = blog2(max(D))c and 1 ≤ w ≤ W + 1. We then
set D−w = 2w − d for all d ∈ D and d < 2w. Note that W + 1 corresponds to the number of
bits in the largest digit in D. Therefore, a window can be as big as the maximum number
of bits in a digit set D and as small as one bit. Once we have all D−w of the digit set D for
all w such that 1 ≤ w ≤ W + 1, we can scan k from right to left to determine its recoding.
Our recoding algorithm is sequential and works from the least significant end of the
scalar k. In a given iteration, if k is even, then the corresponding recoded digit is simply
0 and k is shifted one position right. The updated k is used in the next iteration. When
k is odd, the recoding involves a number of steps. The main idea behind these steps is
that we replace the least significant w bits of k with either the w-tuple (0, 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
w−1 zeros
, d) or
the (w + 1)-tuple (1, 0, 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
w−1 zeros
,−d). While doing the replacement, we ensure that the
value of k remains unchanged. The value of w is set to W + 1 initially and it is reduced
by 1 if there is no appropriate tuple for a given w. Since the digit set contains 1, we are
guaranteed to find a replacement tuple that does not change the value of k. We note that
the (w + 1)-tuple creates a ’carry ’ that needs to be added to k at bit position w. Below
we summarize the steps for dealing with odd k.
1. The window size w is set to W + 1 = blog2 max(D)c+ 1.
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2. A window of w bits is extracted from integer k into a variable ktemp.
3. Compare ktemp to d where d ∈ D. If there is a digit d equals to ktemp, the least
significant w bits of k are replaced by (0, 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
w−1
, d). Then, we update k by shifting
it right by w bits, skip the following steps and start recoding the updated k.
4. We compare ktemp to d such that d = 2
w−d ∀d ∈ Dw and d < 2w. If such a digit d is
found, we replace the least significant w bits of k by (0, 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
w−1
,−d). Then, we shift
k to the right by w bits, and add 1 (i.e., a carry) to k. Then, we skip the following
step and start recoding the updated k.
5. We subtract 1 from w and the algorithm continues from Step 2.
In the worst case, the addition in step 4 above may cause the carry to propagate all
the way to the most significant bit of k, requiring an adder of size close to n bits. For
ECC scalar multiplication, the value of n can be several hundreds. In order to avoid a long
adder, we do not explicitly add the carry; rather we store it separately. At the end of an
iteration of the recoding algorithm, the shifted k (refer to step 4) as well as the carry are
passed to the next iteration. Below we explain how it works.
We write the scalar as k = k′ + c, where c is a carry which is either 0 or 1. We note
that if the least significant bit of k′ (LSB(k′)) and c are the same, then it corresponds to
an even k, and shifting k by one position to right is equivalent to simply shifting k′ by
one position right and making no changes to c. On the other hand, LSB(k′) and c being
different corresponds to an odd k, which can be obtained simply forcing its LSB to be 1
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and copying other bits from k′. This scheme completely avoids the use of an n-bit adder
to add the carry to k in our recoding algorithm.
We note that unlike Algorithm 9, we do not use D+w . This is to avoid generating any
negative carry.
The steps mentioned above are put together in algorithm format below (Algorithm
11). The worst case of Algorithm 11 is O((l · (W − 2) · n) where n is the number of bits in
an integer k, and l is the number of digits in the digit set D.
The new variant of the recoding algorithm can be advantageous for hardware imple-
mentation over the original one. This is mainly because Algorithm 11 requires simple
operations such as scan, match and shift that are easy to implement. Moreover, unlike
Algorithm 9, the new variant does not require an adder of size of n.
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Algorithm 11 Implementation-Friendly Recoding Algorithm (IFRA)
Require: k = (kn−1, · · · , k1, k0), digit set D
Ensure: Representation of k using digits in set D
1: W = blog2(max(D))c
2: rdr = [] . Initialization of rdr to store the result
3: k′ ← k, c← 0
4: while k′ 6= 0 or c 6= 0 do
5: if LSB(k′) ⊕ c = 0 then
6: append 0 to rdr and shift right k′ by 1 bit.
7: else
8: LSB(k′) ← 1 . Bits other than LSB remain unchanged for k′
9: c← 0
10: for w = W + 1 to 1 do
11: extract w bits and store it in k temp
12: for d in D do
13: if d = k temp then
14: append (0, 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
w−1
, d) to rdr
15: shift k′ to the right by w bits
16: flag = 1 . This flag is set to break from the outer (for) loop
17: break
18: else if d < 2w and 2w − d = k temp then
19: append (0, 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
w−1
,−d) to rdr
20: shift k′ to the right by w bits
21: c← 1
22: flag = 1
23: break
24: end if
25: end for
26: end for
27: end if
28: if flag = 1 then
29: flag = 0 . if a value d is found, break from the loop to check k
30: break
31: end if
32: end while
33: return rdr
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Correctness of Algorithm 11 is ensured because IFRA only substitutes a window of
size w by an equal value from the digit set D or the negative of a value from D and a
carry. Therefore, the value of k never changes and Algorithm 11 always results in a correct
representation of an integer k. Furthermore, Algorithm 11 is guaranteed to terminate
because the absolute value of k monotonically decreases each iteration until the value of k
reaches 0.
Example 1
Below is an example of Algorithm 11 in details:
Let k = 31415. Then, the binary representation of k is (111101010110111)2. Let the
digit set D be as following D = {1, 3, 23, 27}, where the binary form of the set D is
D = {1, 11, 10111, 11011}
We computeW = blog2(27)c = 4. Then, we find allD−w such thatD−w = 2w − d : d ∈ D and d < 2w
for 1 ≤ w ≤ W + 1. We end up with the following sets:
D−2 = {1, 3} ={01, 11}
D−3 = {1, 5, 7} ={001, 101, 111}
D−4 = {5, 9, 13, 15} ={0101, 1001, 1101, 1111}
D−5 = {5, 9, 29, 31} ={00101, 01001, 11101, 11111}
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Note that D−1 is not mentioned above because it only contains one element which is
D−1 = {1}.
Now, let’s apply the steps mentioned above on the example given where k = (111101010110111)2.
First, we initialize k′ = k = (111101010110111)2 and c = 0. Since w = blog2(27)c+ 1 = 5,
we scan the first 5 bits of k′.
k′ = (1111010101
︷ ︸︸ ︷
10111
k temp
)2 and c = 0
Since k temp = (10111)2 which equals to 23 = (10111)2, we would have the following
rdr = (0, 0, 0, 0, 23). Then, k′ is shifted to the right by w = 5 bits k′ = (1111010101)2 and
w is set to w = W + 1 = 5.
We repeat the algorithm again since k′ 6= 0. So, we scan the first 5 bits of k′.
k′ = (11110
︷ ︸︸ ︷
10101
x
)2 and c = 0
Since there is no d ∈ D such that d = x or 25 − d = k temp where d < 25, we reduce w by
1 and we will have the following:
k′ = (111101
︷︸︸︷
0101
k temp
)2 and c = 0
Also there is no d that equals to k temp or 24 − d = x, where d < 24. Therefore, we
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reduce w by 1 and continue as follows:
k′ = (1111010
︷︸︸︷
101
k temp
)2 and c = 0
Here, 23 − 3 = 5 = (101)2 matches x. Therefore, the result would be rdr =
(0, 0,−3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 23) and k′ is shifted right by w bits and c = 1. Then, we will have
k′ = (11
︷ ︸︸ ︷
11010
k temp
)2 and c = 1
Since k′⊕ c = 1, we set LSB(k) to 1 and we reset c to 0. Then, we extract w bits as follows
k′ = (11
︷ ︸︸ ︷
11011
k temp
)2
Since k temp = (11011)2 which equals to 27 = (11011)2, we would have the following
rdr = (0, 0, 0, 0, 27, 0, 0,−3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 23). Then, k′ is shifted to the right by w = 5 bits
k′ = (11)2 and w is set to w = W + 1 = 5.
Finally
k′ = (
︷︸︸︷
11
k temp
)2 and c = 0
Here, we can find d ∈ D which equals to k temp. Therefore, we would have rdr =
(0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 27, 0, 0,−3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 23) and k′ is shifted right by 2 bits.
In the end, we will have k′ = 0 and the IFRA of the integer k using the random digit
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set D = {1, 3, 23, 27} is
rdr = (3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 27, 0, 0,−3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 23)2 (4.1)
4.2 Average Density
The average density of the original RDR algorithm [22] is 1
aD+1
, where aD is computed
using Equation. 3.1. The proposed IFRA is functionally similar to the RDR algorithm
except that the former does not use D+w . To compare the average densities of the two
algorithms, we have randomly selected some digit sets and performed recoding exhaustively
in software. In this experiment, several 192-bit numbers were recoded using RDR and
IFRA. Then, the average density of the output of each algorithm is found using exhaustive
search on non-zero digits. The average density that was calculated is for digit sets of the
size between 5 to 30, where the random digit is in the range of [1, 300). Results of our
experiment are shown in Table 4.1. As can be seen in the table, the average density of
non-zero digits for IFRA is almost always higher than that of the original RDR algorithm,
but the difference is small.
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Table 4.1: Comparison between average density of RDR and IFRA
# elements in D RDR IFRA
5 0.2132 0.2305
6 0.1915 0.1915
7 0.1924 0.2083
8 0.1728 0.1763
9 0.1778 0.1964
10 0.1781 0.1853
11 0.1647 0.1826
12 0.1650 0.1720
13 0.1639 0.1703
14 0.1617 0.1698
15 0.1654 0.1688
16 0.1584 0.1726
17 0.1508 0.1604
18 0.1526 0.1546
19 0.1509 0.1591
20 0.1525 0.1575
21 0.1537 0.1617
22 0.1515 0.1575
23 0.1511 0.1545
24 0.1445 0.1615
25 0.1450 0.1587
26 0.1503 0.1705
27 0.1452 0.1486
28 0.1371 0.1577
29 0.1410 0.1531
30 0.1474 0.1555
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4.3 Hardware Implementation
There are many research papers presenting hardware implementation of crypto pro-
cessors for ECC. However, it is usually assumed that the scalar k is already recoded and
stored in memory. So, a hardware implementation of a recoding algorithm is not usually
provided in a crypto processor. In this section, we present a hardware implementation for
IFRA (Algorithm 11). The hardware design consists of the following units:
• Dual port memory.
• Address Computation unit.
• Shift register.
• Control Unit.
Figure 4.1 shows a block diagram of our design. It also shows the system’s different
components and the connection between blocks.
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Figure 4.1: A block diagram of the suggested hardware design for Algorithm 11
4.3.1 Dual Port Memory Module
In this design, we use a dual port memory to store and write the results. The advantage
of using dual port memory is the ability of reading and writing to two different memory
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locations at the same time. In our implementation, we assume that all sets D−w are already
computed and stored in the memory. However, these values need to be stored in a way that
is easy to access without taking lot of space or repeating any values. First, we compute
W = blog2max(D)c and # of elements in D is L. Then, precomputed values are stored in
the memory as follows:
• Store all elements of D into the first L locations of memory.
• For each subsequent L locations, we store D−2 , D−3 · · · D−W+1, where each set takes L
locations. If there is a value d such that 2w − d < 0, we store 0 in the correspondent
memory location. This will make accessing the variable easier and the algorithm will
not consider these values.
The writing address starts from a preset offset and is incremented by 4 every time
an entry is added. If we consider Example 1 mentioned in Section 4.1 where the digit set
D = {1, 3, 23, 27}, the precomputed sets of D are presented in Table 4.2. Moreover, the
output we got in Example 1 (4.1) is stored back in the same memory as shown in Table
4.3.
Figure 4.2 shows the dual port memory block with its accompanied inputs and outputs.
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Figure 4.2: A block diagram of Read Only Memory
An example of memory structure for precomputed values of D = {1, 3, 23, 27} is shown
in Table 4.2.
40
Table 4.2: Memory structure for the example mentioned in Section 4.1, where the random
digit set is D = {1, 3, 23, 27}
Dw Address Memory content
D
0 1
4 3
8 23
12 27
D−2
16 22 − 1
20 22 − 3
24 0
28 0
D−3
32 23 − 1
36 23 − 3
40 0
44 0
· · · · · · · · ·
D−5
64 25 − 1
68 25 − 3
72 25 − 23
76 25 − 27
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Table 4.3: The output of recoding Algorithm 11 stored in a memory. The output shown
is for k = 31415 and D = {1, 3, 23, 27}.
Address Memory content
offset + 0 23
offset + 4 0
offset + 8 0
offset + 12 0
offset + 16 0
offset + 20 -3
offset + 24 0
offset + 28 0
offset + 32 27
offset + 36 0
offset + 40 0
offset + 44 0
offset + 48 0
offset + 52 3
4.3.2 Address Computation Module
This module computes the next address that will be read from the dual port memory.
It always starts reading from the beginning and if no match is found with the temporary
register, it starts checking 2w − d ∀ d ∈ D. If no match is found in the latter set, the
control unit reduces the value of w by 1.
There is a counter in address computation module that tracks how many entries the
module has checked. So, when the module checks L values, where L is the size of D, the
next address will be the first location of Dw for some value 1 ≤ w ≤ W + 1.
The following equation shows how a next address is computed if we have checked all
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elements in D and no value satisfies the temporary register content.
address = address+ 4 ∗ L ∗ (w − 2) + 4 (4.2)
To give an example of Equation. 4.2 assume that we have the addresses as shown in
Table 4.2. Let w = 5. Then as we reach address 3 and no value is matching the register,
we need to check all elements of D5. Therefore, the next address will be
12 + 4 ∗ (5− 2) ∗ 4 + 4 = 64
which equals to the first address of digit set D5. Figure 4.3 shows the address computation
module with its accompanied inputs and outputs.
Figure 4.3: Block diagram of Address Computation Module
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4.3.3 Control Unit Module
Control unit module is the main unit in the system which controls all other modules.
The main operations of control unit are the following:
• Reset address computation when a value is found.
• Reduce the value of w if the flag signal from address computation module is set.
• Enable the write memory module to store results.
• Shift the register when a value is found.
• Remove the most significant bit (MSB) of temporary register if no value is found.
Then, it resets address computation and reduce w by 1.
The control unit has a done signal, which is set when the value of shift register, which
stores k, becomes 0. Moreover, since we need to find the location of most significant bit
that is set to 1, a simple decoder is designed to return the location of MSB set of the input.
Figure 4.4 shows the control unit module with its accompanied inputs and outputs.
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Figure 4.4: Block diagram of Control Unit Module
4.3.4 Hardware Implementation Results
Verilog has been used to describe the hardware design. Then, the code has been synthe-
sized on Artix-7 FPGA (7a200tsbv484-1). The hardware utilization of our implementation
of Algorithm 11 is as follows. The number of LUTs used is 1196 out of 134600 (0.89%
utilization). Only, 0.5 block RAM has been used out of 365 (0.14% utilization). Finally,
428 registers have been used in the design out of 269200 on the FPGA (0.16% utilization).
4.4 Comparison Results
In this section, we present a comparison between the runtime of IFRA, RDR, and
wNAF using software implementation. In order to have a fair comparison, we have imple-
mented wNAF, RDR, and IFRA using Python. The average results have been recorded
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after running each algorithm 1000 times on a 64-bit processor. The specs of the machine
is Intel Core i7-6500U CPU @ 2.50GHz. The processor has 2 cores, and a cache size of
4096 KB.
Table 4.4 shows the comparison between the time it takes to recode NIST scalars using
IFRA, RDR, and wNAF recoding algorithms. The time is recorded using the time library
provided in Python. Figure 4.5 shows the runtime comparison between IFRA, RDR, and
wNAF for w = 7. As shown in Table 4.4, IFRA recodes faster than RDR because of simple
operations used in the algorithm.
Table 4.4: Time (in seconds) needed to find the recoding representation of IFRA, RDR,
and wNAF recoding algorithms
Window (w) 5 7 9
Algorithm IFRA RDR wNAF IFRA RDR wNAF IFRA RDR wNAF
p192 0.00058 0.001871 0.00011 0.00138 0.0032 0.000124 0.005669 0.01458 0.000121
p224 0.000676 0.003024 0.0001355 0.002253 0.00337 0.000151 0.007788 0.01302 0.000153
p256 0.000687 0.003038 0.000150 0.001248 0.00371 0.000187 0.005504 0.01059 0.000174
p384 0.000878 0.004361 0.000243 0.002413 0.00603 0.000303 0.013053 0.02022 0.000289
p521 0.001586 0.005875 0.000361 0.007366 0.00867 0.000459 0.012109 0.0309 0.000449
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Figure 4.5: Recoding speed comparison of IFRA, RDR, and wNAF for NIST curves (w = 7)
4.5 Application to Scalar Multiplication
Different recoding schemes are used to speed up or improve various aspects of scalar
multiplication, such as its resistance to side-channel analysis attacks. In this section, we
present the timing results of implementing IFRA (Algorithm 11) in Python within a scalar
multiplication implementation. Python is used for its ease of implementation and its data
structure libraries that help in speeding up the development time. In this work, scalar
multiplication on elliptic curve is implemented using double-and-add in order to compare
different recoding algorithms, namely NAF, binary and wNAF, to IFRA. Python code for
IFRA software implementation is given in Appendix A.
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4.5.1 Precomputation
Algorithm 11 and wNAF require pre-computing some points. Once we have all pre-
computed points, we use Algorithm 10 to find the scalar multiplication of an integer to a
point on elliptic curve.
In case of wNAF, we can use an addition chain in the form of {1, 2, 3, 5, 7, . . . , 2w−1−1}
where w is the window size. However, if the same chain is used for IFRA, m/2 integers
would be computed when only m/4 might be needed in the best case where m = 2w−1 − 1
[22].
There are different algorithms that use addition chains or sequence of powers to com-
pute exponentiation such as Yao’s algorithm [36], Brauer’s algorithm [3], and Pippenger’s
algorithm [28]. In this work, we have a specific case where we need to compute all points
d ∈ D and we know the following:
• d is odd for all d ∈ D.
• The digit set D consists of relatively small digits. So, we need to compute dP for
small values.
Therefore, since our case is limited by odd numbers, we can use a simple approach to
pre-compute dP for all d ∈ D as follows:
1. Create an empty lookup table and add first element which is (1, P ).
2. If the current value is less than half of the next value in the digit set, the current
point is doubled and added to 1P .
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3. If the current value is greater than half of the next value in the digit set, the current
point is added to 2P .
4. If the current value equals to the next element of the digit set, a new entry is added
to the lookup table (d, dP ).
5. Continue until the current element is equal to maximum element in D.
Table 4.5 shows the time required to precompute the points for wNAF and IFRA
where w = 7. It is clear that IFRA precomputation is faster than wNAF, this is because
of the addition chain which is used to pre-compute the points of wNAF. Even though the
window sizes of both schemes are equal, the number of digits in the digit set of IFRA
is either less or equal to wNAF. As a result, IFRA precomputation takes less time than
wNAF precomputation.
Table 4.5: Precomputation time comparison (in seconds) between wNAF and IFRA
NIST Curves IFRA wNAF
P192 0.012841 0.0176587
P224 0.015954 0.0180136
P256 0.012965 0.023257
P384 0.038869 0.074197
P512 0.116408 0.117022
4.5.2 Scalar Multiplication Comparison
In order to give a better view of how IFRA algorithm is compared to RDR, NAF,
and wNAF recoding schemes, we have evaluated the time it takes to compute the scalar
multiplication using recommended NIST curves [17]. To do so, we have evaluated the scalar
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multiplication for each curve by running each test for 1000 iterations and then we take
the average of all executions. Table 4.6 shows the comparison of using different recoding
algorithms for scalar multiplication. We assume all pre-computed points are already stored
in a lookup table where it can be accessed in O(1).
Table 4.6: Scalar multiplication computing time (in seconds) using the double-and-add
algorithm for IFRA, RDR, wNAF, and NAF recoding on NIST curves
NIST Curves NAF wNAF IFRA RDR
P192 0.017478 0.013137 0.013933 0.014713
P224 0.023361 0.018014 0.018817 0.018048
P256 0.029005 0.024489 0.025174 0.025781
P384 0.070487 0.057359 0.056305 0.057604
P512 0.148497 0.116373 0.116408 0.118699
It is clear from Table 4.6 that wNAF, RDR, and IFRA take almost the same amount
of time to compute the scalar multiplication. Also, Figure 4.6 shows a graphical represen-
tation of the speed comparisons from Table 4.6.
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Figure 4.6: A graphical representation of Table 4.6 to show the speed of computing scalar
multiplication using NAF, wNAF, RDR, and IFRA
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have introduced a variant (IFRA) of Algorithm 9. Then, the average
density of IFRA has been investigated and compared to that of Algorithm 9. Furthermore,
a hardware implementation of IFRA has been proposed. This hardware design consists of a
dual port memory, address computation, shift register, and control unit where precomputed
points are stored in the memory. Only one dual port memory is used in order to reduce the
amount of block RAMs and LUTs usage on FPGA. Additionally, a comparison between
the runtime of IFRA, RDR, and wNAF has been presented. Finally, an application to
scalar multiplication using IFRA has been provided where a pre-computation comparison
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between wNAF and IFRA is shown along with a software performance comparison among
NAF, wNAF, RDR, and IFRA. Since IFRA is similar to RDR in the sense that both use
random digits, they are expected to provide similar resistance to side-channel analysis.
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Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, a summary of the thesis is presented. In addition, potential future
work is briefly discussed.
5.1 Summary
In this thesis, we have investigated the random digit representation (RDR) algorithm
[22] and proposed a variant (namely IFRA) to make it hardware friendly. Furthermore, we
have presented a hardware implementation of IFRA. The hardware has been synthesized
using Xilinx tools and the results of the FPGA resource utilization have been presented.
Moreover, a python script has been developed to compare the time it takes to recode an
integer using different algorithms, namely NAF, wNAF, and IFRA. Then, a comparison of
their precomputation time has been presented. The result shows that the precomputation
of IFRA is faster than wNAF. This is due to the size of IFRA digit set which is smaller than
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or equal to wNAF for the same w. Finally, IFRA is used in scalar multiplication application
to compare its performance against NAF, wNAF, and RDR. The scalar multiplication time
is almost the same as in wNAF and IFRA. However, IFRA and RDR provide resistance to
side-channel analysis, such as SPA and DPA, which is an important advantage over wNAF.
5.2 Future Work
In this work, we have only worked with affine coordinates. However, projective coor-
dinates and Jacobi coordinates could be used instead of affine coordinates. As a result, a
different hardware implementation is required if coordinates are different.
Furthermore, we assumed pre-computed points are already stored in the memory,
which might not be the case in a real-world scenario. Therefore, finding a way to speed up
the computation of
2w − d, where d ∈ D and 1 ≤ w ≤ blog2max(D)c+ 1
will improve the overall design and make it more practical. In addition, many crypto
co-processor designs have been published, such as [1], [34], [32], and [5]. Integrating Al-
gorithm 11 into an ECC crypto processor could be considered to improve the overall per-
formance. Finally, the current design does not support parallelism. So, there is a good
opportunity to exploit parallelism by improving the hardware design suggested in Chapter
4. A simple method of parallelism can be reading multiple entries from memory and com-
paring all of them with the temporary register at once. This will save a lot of clock cycles
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that results from reading the memory and updating the address and w variables.
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Appendix A
APPENDICES
A.1 Implementation Friendly Random Algorithm (IFRA)
- Software Implementation
def RDR_algorithm(D, k):
rdr = []
# Change integer to binary
bin_k = bin(k)[2:]
# get number of bits
Wn = get_Wn(D)
flag_d = 0
c = 0
62
# global carry
while bin_k != ’’ or c > 0:
if bin_k == ’’: # carry is 1
rdr.insert(0, 1)
c = 0
continue
# if LSB(k) xor c = 0, zero is appened to rdr and k is shifted right 1 bit
if (bin_k[len(bin_k)-1] == ’0’ and c == 0 ) or (bin_k[len(bin_k)-1] == ’1’ and c
== 1):
rdr.insert(0, 0)
bin_k = bin_k[:len(bin_k)-1]
continue
# if LSB(k) xor c = 1, we extract w bit
# convert bin_k to an array to allow change of one bit easily
bin_s = list(bin_k)
bin_s[len(bin_k)-1] = ’1’
bin_k = "".join(bin_s)
c = 0
for w in range(Wn + 1, 0, -1):
# if the window is bigger than the length of k, we need to have smaller windwo
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if (w > len(bin_k)):
continue
# extract w bits from bin_k
k_reg = bin_k[len(bin_k) - w:]
for d in D:
# we check every d in the digit set D
bin_d = bin(d)[2:] # get the binary representation of d
# d cannot be chosen unless the value is less than the extracted window.
if d <= k_reg:
if int(bin_d, 2) ^ int(k_reg, 2) == 0:
rdr.insert(0, d)
# inserting w-1 zeros
for j in range(0, w-1):
rdr.insert(0, 0)
# update k by shifting it right w bits
bin_k = bin_k[:len(bin_k) - w]
# set flag_d to 1 to set the window to Wn+1
flag_d = 1
break
if flag_d == 1:
flag_d = 0
break
for d in D:
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# we check every d in the digit set D
bin_d = bin(d)[2:] # get the binary representation of d
# compute the negative residue of d, if neg_d is negative, it is ignored by
setting it to 0.
neg_d = 2**w - d
while neg_d < 0:
neg_d = 0
neg_bin_d = bin(neg_d)[2:] # get the binary representation of neg_d
if int(neg_bin_d, 2) ^ int(k_reg, 2) == 0 and neg_d != 1:
rdr.insert(0, -d)
# Inserting zeros
for j in range(0, w-1):
rdr.insert(0, 0)
# update k by shifting it right w bits
bin_k = bin_k[:len(bin_k) - w]
c = 1
# update k after adding a carry to LSB
# set flag_d to 1 to set the window to Wn+1
flag_d = 1
break
# break out of the for loop to check if we finished k or not
if flag_d == 1:
flag_d = 0
break
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# In the end, there might be some leading zeros which are not needed,
# this while loop removes the leading zeros and update k accordingly
while (rdr[0] == 0):
rdr = rdr[1:]
# return the result, and length of result
return rdr
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A.2 Implementation Friendly Random Algorithm (IFRA)
- Hardware Implementation
module rdr #(parameter n = 231) (clk, reset, addr_out,k, di_out, done);
input clk;
input [n-1:0] k;
input reset;
output [31:0] addr_out;
output [31:0] di_out;
output done;
parameter mem_offset = 25;
reg [n-1:0] k_reg;
// Function to get the MSP bit
function [31:0] MSB_position;
input [31:0] select;
reg [31:0] out;
begin
casex(select)
32’b00000000000000000000000000000001: out = 32’h0;
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32’b0000000000000000000000000000001x: out = 32’h1;
32’b000000000000000000000000000001xx: out = 32’h2;
32’b00000000000000000000000000001xxx: out = 32’h3;
32’b0000000000000000000000000001xxxx: out = 32’h4;
32’b000000000000000000000000001xxxxx: out = 32’h5;
32’b00000000000000000000000001xxxxxx: out = 32’h6;
32’b0000000000000000000000001xxxxxxx: out = 32’h7;
32’b000000000000000000000001xxxxxxxx: out = 32’h8;
32’b00000000000000000000001xxxxxxxxx: out = 32’h9;
32’b0000000000000000000001xxxxxxxxxx: out = 32’ha;
32’b000000000000000000001xxxxxxxxxxx: out = 32’hb;
32’b00000000000000000001xxxxxxxxxxxx: out = 32’hc;
32’b0000000000000000001xxxxxxxxxxxxx: out = 32’hd;
32’b000000000000000001xxxxxxxxxxxxxx: out = 32’he;
32’b00000000000000001xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx: out = 32’hf;
32’b0000000000000001xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx: out = 32’h10;
32’b000000000000001xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx: out = 32’h11;
32’b00000000000001xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx: out = 32’h12;
32’b0000000000001xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx: out = 32’h13;
32’b000000000001xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx: out = 32’h14;
32’b00000000001xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx: out = 32’h15;
32’b0000000001xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx: out = 32’h16;
32’b000000001xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx: out = 32’h17;
32’b00000001xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx: out = 32’h18;
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32’b0000001xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx: out = 32’h19;
32’b000001xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx: out = 32’h1a;
32’b00001xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx: out = 32’h1b;
32’b0001xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx: out = 32’h1c;
32’b001xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx: out = 32’h1d;
32’b01xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx: out = 32’h1e;
32’b1xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx: out = 32’h1f;
default: out = 0;
endcase
MSB_position = out;
end
endfunction
reg [31:0] addr;
wire [31:0] data_out;
logic [31:0] addr_write, data_in_write;
assign addr_out = addr;
assign di_out = data_out;
logic [5:0] wn_wire;
wire stop_reading;
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logic restart;
logic flag;
logic neg;
logic [5:0] count;
logic [31:0] r_addr;
reg write_en;
compute_address com_add(.clk(clk), .stop_reading(stop_reading), .reset(reset), .
restart(restart), .Wn(wn_wire), .address(addr), .flag(flag), .neg(neg), .
count(count));
ram rw_mem(.rclk(clk), .reset(flag), .wclk(clk), .d_in(data_in_write), .w_addr(
addr_write), .r_addr(r_addr), .write_en(write_en), .d_out(data_out));
parameter Wn = 6;
parameter size = 4;
reg [Wn-1:0] shiftRegister;
reg found;
reg found1;
reg [31:0] write_reg;
reg reset_wn;
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assign done = (k_reg == 0) & (write_reg == 0)? 1 : 0;
// change r_addr if the value is negative to get the negative value of the digit
assign r_addr = !(found && neg) ? addr : (count == 0) ? size-1 : count-1;
always @* begin
if (reset | reset_wn) begin
stop_reading <= 0;
end
else begin
if (data_out == shiftRegister) begin
if (data_out == shiftRegister) begin
found = 1;
stop_reading = 1
else
found = 0;
end
end
end
end
// This block for updating Wn values.
always @(posedge clk or posedge reset or posedge reset_wn) begin
if(reset_wn | reset) begin
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restart <=1;
wn_wire <= Wn;
reset_wn <= 0;
end
else begin
restart <= 0;
if (flag && wn_wire != 2) begin
wn_wire <= wn_wire - 1;
restart <= 1;
end
end
end
reg [Wn-1:0] mask;
reg carry;
reg check_carry;
wire stop_writing = (write_en && mask == 1) ? 1 : 0;
always @(posedge clk or posedge reset) begin
if (reset) begin
carry <= 0;
check_carry <= 0;
end
else begin
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if (check_carry) begin
// stop checking carry and k_reg
end
else begin
if ((k_reg[0] ^ carry) == 0) begin
write_reg <= 0;
write_en <= 1;
k_reg <= k_reg >> 1;
mask <= 1;
end
else begin
check_carry <= 1;
write_en <= 0;
shiftRegister <= k_reg[Wn-1:0] + carry;
carry <= 0;
mask <= {Wn-1{1’b1}};
end
end
end
end
always @(posedge clk or posedge reset) begin
if (reset) begin
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mask <= {Wn-1{1’b1}};
end
else begin
if (write_en && mask != 1) begin
mask <= mask >> 1;
end
else if (write_en && mask == 1) begin
write_en <= 0;
check_carry <= 0;
reset_wn <= 1;
mask <= {Wn-1{1’b1}};
end
end
end
// always clk or reset or reset_wn
always @(posedge clk or posedge reset) begin
if (reset) begin
k_reg <= k; // initalize k_reg
shiftRegister <= k[Wn-1:0]; // initalize the shift register
mask <= {Wn-1{1’b1}};
end
else begin
if (check_carry) begin
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// remove MSB(k)
if (~found && flag) begin
// if not found, keep cheecking the register
shiftRegister <= shiftRegister & mask;
mask <= mask >> 1;
end
else if (found & neg) begin
// if we found the negative value of a digit
write_reg <= -data_out;
carry <= 1;
write_en <= 1;
mask <= mask | (1 << (MSB_position(mask)+1));
k_reg <= k_reg >> MSB_position(mask) + 2;
end
else if (found) begin
write_en <= 1;
write_reg <= data_out;
k_reg <= k_reg >> MSB_position(mask) + 2;
mask <= {Wn-1{1’b1}};
end
end
end
end
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// Write result to write memory
always @(posedge clk or posedge reset) begin
if (reset) begin
addr_write <= mem_offset*4 + 1;
write_en <= 0;
end
else begin
if (write_en) begin
data_in_write <= write_reg;
// Reset the write reg
write_reg <= 0;
addr_write <= addr_write + 1;
end
end
end
endmodule
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module ram #(parameter addr_width = 9, data_width = 32) (d_in, reset, write_en,
w_addr, r_addr, wclk, rclk, d_out);
input [addr_width-1:0] w_addr, r_addr;
input reset;
input [data_width-1:0] d_in;
input write_en, rclk, wclk;
output reg [data_width-1:0] d_out;
reg [data_width-1:0] mem [(1 << addr_width)-1:0];
parameter mem_file = "precomputation.x";
initial $readmemh(mem_file, mem);
// read memory
always @(posedge rclk or posedge reset) begin
if (reset) begin
d_out <= 0;
end
else begin
d_out <= mem[r_addr];
end
end
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// write memory
always @(posedge wclk) begin
if (write_en)
mem[w_addr] <= d_in;
end
endmodule
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/*
* This module computes the address to read next from read_mem
* It starts reading always from the beginning of the memory.
* However, if the number is not found, we check 2^(Wn-1) - Di
* Therefore, the address looks for the address of 2^(Wn-1) - D1
*/
module compute_address #(parameter n = 5, size = 4, offset = ’h80020000) (clk,
reset, stop_reading, restart, Wn, address, flag, neg, count);
input clk;
input reset;
input restart;
input stop_reading;
input [n-1:0] Wn;
output reg [31:0] address;
output flag;
output reg neg;
output reg [5:0] count;
// This flag is for the control unit to change Wn value. It’s set when all
values for a specific Wn is checked
assign flag = restart == 1 ? 0 : (count == size-1 && neg) ? 1 : 0;
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always @(posedge clk or posedge restart) begin
if (restart) begin
count <= 0;
end
else begin
// If flag is set, that means Wn needs to be updated
if(flag) count <= 0;
else count <= count + 1;
end
end
always @(posedge clk or posedge restart) begin
if (reset || restart) begin
count <= 0;
address <= 0;
neg <= 0;
end
if (stop_reading) begin
address <= address;
end
else begin
/*
* If we checked all D values, and we didnt’ check the neg values of the D values
,
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* update the address to read the negative values of D
*/
if (count == size-1 && ~neg) begin
address <= address + size*(Wn-2) + 1;
count <= 0;
neg <= 1;
end
else begin
address <= address + 1;
// count <= count + 1;
end
end
end
endmodule
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